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Séminaire du GERAD

Technological choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game


31 oct. 2019   11h00 — 12h00

Fabio Lamantia Universitá della Calabria, Italie

We propose and analyze a two-stage oligopoly game in which firms first simultaneously choose production technologies and in the second stage simultaneously choose production quantities. After characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game, we cast our static model in a dynamic setting exploring the stability properties of the market equilibrium in two different cases: (i) exogenous technology distribution and Cournot adjustments; (ii) endogenous technology distribution in an infinite population game with Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs. The main aim of the paper is that of extending the results about Cournot oligopoly stability in an evolutionary setting of heterogeneous decreasing returns-to-scale technologies. We show how the interplay between production decisions and R&D decisions can generate endogenous market fluctuations leading to complex dynamic phenomena.

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Georges Zaccour responsable


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Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
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