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Séminaire du GERAD

International trade, imperfect competition, and the stability of international environmental agreements


24 avr. 2019   15h00 — 16h00

Soham Baksi University of Winnipeg, Canada

We analyze the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when the IEA member and non-member countries choose pollution taxes strategically. Production of a good causes transboundary pollution, and the good is traded across countries with imperfectly competitive markets. We find that, while a global IEA involving all countries is unstable under autarky, a move from autarky to free trade may stabilize the grand coalition between countries. As markets become more competitive, it becomes more likely that the global IEA is stable. Further, trade restrictions in the form of "carbon tariffs" can destabilize an otherwise stable grand coalition.

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Georges Zaccour responsable


Salle 4488
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal QC H3T 1J4

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