Electricity planning has increasingly accounted for distributed renewable energy resources (DREs) and active consumer participation. However, existing planning models generally assume that electricity supply is predominantly provided by generation assets under the control of the utility or system operator. This assumption breaks down in countries experiencing structural electricity shortages, where persistent supply deficits have prompted widespread private investment in diesel generators and rooftop photovoltaic (PV) systems outside the formal planning process. Electricity planning becomes a public-private coordination problem in which governments must jointly determine investments in centralized generation, DRE grid integration, and incentive mechanisms that shape household participation. This paper develops a planning framework for structurally shortage-prone electricity systems that jointly optimizes public investment in generation capacity, DRE grid integration, and feed-in tariff (FiT) design while explicitly accounting for endogenous household responses. We formulate the problem as a three-stage sequential game in which the government allocates investments and sets the FiT, households decide whether to participate, and the government subsequently determines electricity prices, feed-in volumes, and electricity supplied to consumers. The framework is empirically implemented through a case study of Lebanon. Results show that (i) under budget constraints, DRE grid integration is prioritized over additional centralized generation, (ii) appropriately designed FiTs induce substantial household participation, and (iii) DRE integration reduces annual electricity system costs by 8-37% and eliminates unserved demand under lower investment budgets than would otherwise be required.