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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Comparative Dynamics in a Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capital Accumulation

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14 nov. 2024   11h00 — 12h00

Chen Ling Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Chine

Chen Ling

Séminaire en format hybride au GERAD local 4488 ou Zoom

We revisit the generalized finite horizon dynamic oligopoly model of capital accumulation in a differential game setting and use the Oniki's variational method to investigate the comparative dynamics of a symmetric Open-loop Nash Equilibria (OLNE) of the game with respect to several variables. We are able to trace the entire path of the comparative dynamics of these variables over the time horizon and we are thus able to determine the dynamics of the effects of changes in the parameters on the symmetric OLNE. An immediate implication of our derived comparative dynamics is that they give sharper envelope predictions than results in the existing literature. For example, we show that the initial value of a firm's own costate variable underestimates the shadow value of the initial capital stock.

Georges Zaccour responsable

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Activité hybride au GERAD
Zoom et salle 4488
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour

Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
Canada

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