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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Environmental Regulation under Sequential Competition


30 nov. 2023   11h00 — 12h00

Ana Espinola-Arredondo Washington State University, États-Unis

Ana Espinola

Présentation sur YouTube.

We examine a polluting industry, competing à la Stackelberg, where an emission fee is sequentially set on the leader and the follower. We evaluate the leader’s output advantage, disentangling two effects: the first-mover and cost advantage. We show that environmental regulation decreases the leader’s output advantage, which is positive when firms are asymmetric. We also measure the output inefficiency if the regulator incorrectly assumes the industry competes simultaneously, identifying in which settings this inefficiency is the largest. Our extensions allow for inflexible emission fees, several leaders and followers, product differentiation, and for the follower to hold a cost advantage.

Georges Zaccour responsable


Montréal Québec

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