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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Webinaire : Asymptotic Behavior and Selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Stackelberg Games

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16 fév. 2023   11h00 — 12h00

Maria Carmela Ceparano Università Degli Studi Di Napoli Federico II, Italie

Maria Carmela Ceparano

Lien pour le webinaire.

The study on how equilibria behave when perturbations occur in the data of a game is a fundamental theme, since actions and payoffs of the players may be affected by uncertainty or trembles. In this presentation we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and of the SPNE outcomes in one-leader one-follower Stackelberg games under perturbations both of the action sets and of the payoff functions. The investigation allows also to define selection methods for SPNEs that can accommodate various behaviors of the players. More precisely, we show that perturbations relying on a Tikhonov regularization, on an adverse-to-move behaviour and on an altruistic behaviour can produce specific selection results associated to such perturbations.

(with Francesco Caruso and Jacqueline Morgan)

Georges Zaccour responsable
Ke Jiang responsable
Fatemeh Zand responsable

Lieu

Webinaire
Zoom
Montréal Québec
Canada

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Axe de recherche