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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Price and Quality Competition While Envisioning a Quality-Related Product Recall


2 fév. 2023   11h00 — 12h00

Amirhossein Jafarzadeh Ghazi University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada

Amirhossein Jafarzadeh Ghazibjet

Présentation sur YouTube.

Many product recalls are caused by quality-related product failures. When such recalls occur, the effects may not only be limited to the firm selling the product but also extend to competing firms in the category. This study analyzes quality and pricing strategies for competing firms facing the risk of a severe quality-related recall making the product hazardous and leading to its removal from the market. We develop a two-stage Nash game where the probability of recall depends on the firms’ chosen quality investments, and either firm can experience a recall. We consider a utility-based model where consumers' sensitivity to price and quality can change following the recall. (With Salma Karray.)

Georges Zaccour responsable
Ke Jiang responsable
Fatemeh Zand responsable


Montréal Québec

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