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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Webinaire : Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games


13 oct. 2022   11h00 — 12h00

Alain Jean-Marie Inria - Université de Montpellier, France

Alain Jean-Marie

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We consider two solution concepts for discounted stochastic games: Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSSE) and Fixed Point Equilibrium (FPE) solutions. The SSSE solution is obtained by explicitly solving the Stackelberg equilibrium conditions, while the FPE can be computed efficiently using value or policy iteration algorithms. We investigate the conditions for existence and equivalence of these solution concepts. We prove that the FPE and SSSE exist and coincide for important classes of games, including Myopic Follower Strategy and Team games. This however does not hold in general and we describe examples where one of SSSE or FPE does not exist, or when they both exist, they differ.

Georges Zaccour responsable
Can Baris Cetin responsable
Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi responsable


Montréal Québec

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