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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

On the Interplay between Environmental CSR Practices and Emission Permits


1 déc. 2022   11h00 — 12h00

Alessandro Tampieri University of Firenze, Italie

Alessandro Tampieri

Présentation sur YouTube

We analyse the steady-state industry configuration of an oligopoly composed of profit-seeking (PS) and environmentally socially responsible (ECSR) firms in an evolutionary setting. In the industry, pollution is regulated through an Emission Trading System (ETS) scheme that allocates emissions' rights to firms. Firms may also invest in emission abatement technology to reduce the cost of emission rights. Our main findings show that, despite the commitment toward emission abatement, an individual ECSR firm may pollute more than its PS counterpart. By contrast, the introduction of the ETS puts competitive pressure to ECSR firms by inducing PS firms to invest in emission abatement.
(with Gianluca Iannucci)

Georges Zaccour responsable
Can Baris Cetin responsable
Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi responsable


Montréal Québec

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