31 mars 2022   11h00 — 12h00

Hassan Benchekroun Université McGill, Canada

Hassan Benchekroun

Présentation sur YouTube

We study efficiency-inducing taxation of common-pool resources in oligopoly. In contrast with the existing literature, we consider a novel tax scheme where the tax bill paid by a firm depends only on the current resource stock. The regulator does not need to have information about firm's individual outputs. We establish two main results. First, effciency can be achieved by means of a less informationally demanding tax than the per unit tax usually considered in the literature. Second, the intuitive lessons obtained for a per unit tax may no longer be valid when the tax depends only on the resource stock.

Georges Zaccour responsable
Jafar Chaab responsable
Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi responsable


Montréal Québec Canada

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