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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

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17 juin 2021   11h00 — 12h00

Artem Sedakov Saint Petersburg State University, Russie

Artem Sedakov

In this talk, we investigate a model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities. We suppose that firms, which are located along the river flow, produce goods and compete in a market. The production results in water pollution, and the pollution emissions of a firm can influence downstream counterparts. We analyze this model in detail by incorporating a firm’s location and analytically comparing equilibrium and cooperative behavior. Additionally, we examine the model under myopic behavior where firms place no weight on their future gains.

Georges Zaccour responsable
Can Baris Cetin responsable
Utsav Sadana responsable

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