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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods

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14 jan. 2021   11h00 — 12h00

Florian Wagener University of Amsterdam, Pays-Bas

Florian Wagener

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Nº de réunion : 962 7774 9870
Code secret : 285404

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a class of differential games of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.

Georges Zaccour responsable
Can Baris Cetin responsable
Utsav Sadana responsable

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