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Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

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Jun 17, 2021   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Artem Sedakov Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

Artem Sedakov

In this talk, we investigate a model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities. We suppose that firms, which are located along the river flow, produce goods and compete in a market. The production results in water pollution, and the pollution emissions of a firm can influence downstream counterparts. We analyze this model in detail by incorporating a firm’s location and analytically comparing equilibrium and cooperative behavior. Additionally, we examine the model under myopic behavior where firms place no weight on their future gains.

Georges Zaccour organizer
Can Baris Cetin organizer
Utsav Sadana organizer

Location

Online meeting
Montréal Québec Canada

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