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GERAD seminar

Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium


May 21, 2019   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Francisco Cabo Universidad de Valladolid, Spain

We study an evolutionary game involving two populations sharing the same strategies, but with different payoff matrices. Under pairwise imitation, a revising individual can be paired with and imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population. In the second case, his payoff diverges from the observed payoff of his pair. The asymptotically stable equilibrium depends on the confidence agents assign to what they see versus their own estimation. We analyze how the equilibrium differs from Nash and how it is affected by the confidence agents assign to what they see.

Free entrance.
Welcome to everyone!

Georges Zaccour organizer


Room 4488
André-Aisenstadt Building
Université de Montréal Campus
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal QC H3T 1J4

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