We investigate the effects of a price cap regulation on the consumers surplus within the framework of two gas ownership structures. In the case of a firm owning both the gas transportation and storage facilities, we find that tightening of the price cap constraint is always beneficial to the consumers while softening this constraint is always detrimental in terms of consumers surplus. In the case of a separate ownership, there exist situations when a reduction in one price cap and an increase of the other may lead to consumers surplus deterioration.

We consider a marketing channel formed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The latter sells, along the manufacturer’s brand, her private brand. Demand for each brand depends on prices and on the shelf space allocated to it. We characterize Stackelberg equilibrium with the manufacturer as leader. Numerical analysis allows us to shed a light on the driving forces that matter when it comes to allocate the shelf space between the two competing brands.

We study pricing and advertising decisions for national brands and private labels. An infinite horizon differential game is considered where manufacturers and retailers are decision-makers. The obtained results provide answers on how manufacturers should monitor their national advertising expenditures and prices when facing competition from private labels of retailers.

Over the past decade, the remediation of contaminated sites has become a very expensive (and lucrative) activity. This paper articulates a real-options approach to choosing remediation scenarios. It is argued that, if implemented in practice, this method could yield significant cost reductions.