In this study, an absorbing Markov model for patient flow for stroke patients after discharged from the hospital is proposed. During the study, field data is used to estimate the parameters of the underlying process and evaluate the adequacy of using such a model. The dependence of future flows upon previous care provider visited and creation of new states with which to deal with this dependence gives the model additional information for the prediction of patient movements. The model is proposed as an effective tool for developing an understanding of the process experienced by stroke patients discharged from the hospital to home, for producing an input to asses the care delivery process and for investigating the potential of integration to improve the process.

In this paper we investigate the joint effects of competition and risk aversion on the single-period (newsvendor) inventory problem. Specifically, in our model two risk-averse retailers compete in a market for substitutable products. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in this game. The joint effects of competition and risk aversion on the equilibrium order quantities are also discussed. The comparative statistics of related parameters are presented through analytical/numerical studies.

We consider a multi-stage supply-contract problem in which a firm faces non-stationary stochastic price and demand. We develop a stochastic dynamic programming model to incorporate mixed strategies and purchasing commitments. Since the problem is non linear and concave minimization in nature, dynamic programming algorithm is used to obtain optimal solutions. With inventory is considered, the problem becomes more complicated. Then a new algorithm is developed to obtain optimal solutions for small-sized problems and heuristics are developed for large scale problems. Computational results will be presented and discussed.

In this paper, we consider a two-echelon supply chain model with price sensitive stochastic demand for a single product. We assume that the manufacturer at the upper echelon is the leader and the retailer at the lower echelon is the follower. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and the retailer needs to decide the retail price and ordering quantity from the manufacturer. In the midlife of the planning horizon, the manufacturer has the flexibility of renegotiating the wholesale price and the retailer has the pricing flexibility and the second ordering flexibility. The basic objective of this paper is to understand the value of these flexibilities from both the manufacturer’s point of view and the retailer’s point of view. If the demand in the first portion and the demand in the second portion of the planning horizon are correlated, we also study the value of information updating.