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Séminaire du GERAD

Exploitation of a productive asset in the presence of strategic behavior and pollution externalities

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5 juin 2018   11h00 — 12h00

Baris Vardar HEC Montréal, Canada

This paper studies the behavior of an oligopoly that is composed of a finite number of firms, which compete in exploitation of a commonly accessible productive asset in the presence of pollution externalities. We consider a differential game with two state variables (asset stock and pollution stock), and provide a tractable characterization of the symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable. The results show that the firm strategy takes three forms depending on the pair of state variables, and different choices of model parameters leads to contrasting outcomes in both short- and long-run equilibrium.


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Georges Zaccour responsable

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Salle 4488
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal QC H3T 1J4 Canada

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