In this talk, we are interested in how people's queueing behavior is influenced by the use of incentives. This setting is motivated by applications where a customer may choose to postpone his entry into a queue by accepting to take a so-called diversion, where this diversion is in some way more pleasant than waiting in the queue.
The goal is thus to determine the minimal incentive to be provided by the queue organizing agent to entice users to take the diversion, as a measure sufficient to reduce the overall waiting time in the queue.
We propose a formulation of this problem using stochastic dynamic programming. We further propose a decentralized version of the model where the service agent and the organizing agent does not wish to share all the state information. We show that it is possible to ensure that the solution of the decentralized problem is as efficient as that of the centralized system through the use of transferring contracts between the two agents.
Ce séminaire s'adresse seulement aux étudiants du GERAD.
Nous vous remercions de confirmer votre présence en indiquant votre nom complet. Des pizzas et des breuvages seront servis aux participants ou vous pouvez apporter votre lunch.