Groupe d’études et de recherche en analyse des décisions

Discretely-constrained Nash equilibria

Steven A. Gabriel University of Maryland, États-Unis

This presentation provides a methodology to solve Nash–Cournot energy production games allowing some variables to be discrete. Normally, these games can be stated as mixed complementarity problems but only permit continuous variables in order to make use of each producer’s Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. The proposed approach allows for more realistic modeling and a compromise between integrality and complementarity to avoid infeasible situations.

Selected Relevant References:

  • S.A. Gabriel, S. Siddiqui, A.J. Conejo, C. Ruiz, 2013, “Discretely-Constrained, Nash-Cournot Games with an Application to Power Markets,” Networks and Spatial Economics, 13(3), 307-326.

  • S.A. Gabriel, A.J. Conejo, C. Ruiz, S. Siddiqui , 2013. "Solving Discretely-Constrained, Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems with Applications in Energy, " Computers and Operations Research, 40(5), 1339-1350.