The regime established for the verification of compliance to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) assumes that there may be a real incentive for clandestine violation of Treaty commitments. Formally, therefore, a conflict situation can be said to exist between each Member State and the responsible inspectorate, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this context, verification procedures must be analyzed with the theory of non-cooperative games. On the basis of their Nash equilibria, recommendations can be made to the IAEA regarding the planning and implementation of routine inspection activities at commercial nuclear facilities. By including Von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities that reflect the subjective preferences of the protagonists, sufficient conditions for cooperative behavior, i.e. for compliance, can be determined. Examples of simultaneous and sequential games which model the inspection of large-scale nuclear processing plants and nuclear power reactors will be presented and their solutions discussed.
Group for Research in Decision Analysis