We study the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the presence of sensor deception attacks at their supervisory control layer, where the dynamics are event-based. In our attack model, the attacker has the ability to hijack a subset of sensor readings and mislead the supervisory controller by editing the string of observations, with the goal of inducing the system into an undesirable state. We investigate sequentially two problems. First, we take the viewpoint of the attacker and investigate the problem of synthesizing stealthy attack strategies for a given supervisory control system. Then, we assume the viewpoint of the defender and consider the synthesis of supervisory controllers that are resilient to attacks of the previous type. We present solution methodologies to these two problems that blend algorithmic techniques from games on automata with imperfect information with results from supervisory control theory under partial observation.
Bio: Stéphane Lafortune is the N. Harris McClamroch Collegiate Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. He obtained his degrees from École Polytechnique de Montréal (B.Eng), McGill University (M.Eng), and the University of California at Berkeley (PhD), all in electrical engineering. He is a Fellow of IEEE (1999) and of IFAC (2017). His research interests are in discrete event systems and include multiple problem domains: modeling, diagnosis, control, optimization; applications to computer and software systems; and recently privacy and cyber-security. He co-authored, with C. Cassandras, the textbook Introduction to Discrete Event Systems (2nd Edition, Springer, 2008). He has served as Editor-in-Chief of the journal Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications since 2015.
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