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GERAD seminar

Reciprocal dumping under dichotomous regulation


Jun 6, 2018   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Sébastien Debia HEC Montréal, Canada

We develop a two-player-international-trade game where each player may freely export but have to sell at marginal cost in its local market. We consider a setting where local production is decided after exports. In the symmetric game, the equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the competitive benchmark. We characterize the necessary conditions for the asymmetric equilibrium to be of two-way trade.

Free entrance.
Welcome to everyone!

Georges Zaccour organizer


Room 4488
André-Aisenstadt Building
Université de Montréal Campus
2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal QC H3T 1J4 Canada

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