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GERAD seminar

Exploitation of a productive asset in the presence of strategic behavior and pollution externalities


Jun 5, 2018   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Baris Vardar HEC Montréal, Canada

This paper studies the behavior of an oligopoly that is composed of a finite number of firms, which compete in exploitation of a commonly accessible productive asset in the presence of pollution externalities. We consider a differential game with two state variables (asset stock and pollution stock), and provide a tractable characterization of the symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable. The results show that the firm strategy takes three forms depending on the pair of state variables, and different choices of model parameters leads to contrasting outcomes in both short- and long-run equilibrium.

Free entrance.
Welcome to everyone!

Georges Zaccour organizer


Room 4488
André-Aisenstadt Building
Université de Montréal Campus
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal QC H3T 1J4

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