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Fondation HEC Montréal seminar

The paradox of legal unification


May 31, 2017   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Bertrand Crettez Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, France

In the games used to study legal standardization, the outcome of the usual cooperative solution is never legal unification. We call this property the paradox of legal unification. To solve this paradox, we resort to alternative notions of cooperation. We show that introducing other-regarding preferences or Kantian rules of behavior do not resolve the paradox. By contrast, we show that legal uniformity prevails at any Berge equilibrium of our legal standardization game (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). This, we argue, is a first step towards a solution to the paradox of legal unification.

Free entrance.
Welcome to everyone!

Georges Zaccour organizer


Room 4488
André-Aisenstadt Building
Université de Montréal Campus
2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal QC H3T 1J4 Canada

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