The Thin Green Line: Transboundary Pollution Problems in Coupled Lake Systems

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2nd Workshop Game Theory in Energy, Resources and the Environment 2008

29 June 2008

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Introduction The Game The Model General Results

Numerical Simulations

- The Game
- Non Cooperative Solution
- Dynamic Programming
- Numerical Results
- Stochastic Elements & Droughts

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Single Lake Problem Coupled Lake Problem

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The Single Lake Game

Players: Communities that share the lake

Single Lake Problem Coupled Lake Problem

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The Single Lake Game

- Players: Communities that share the lake
- Pollution: Phosphorus applied to land (controls) Accumulation in the lake (state)

Single Lake Problem Coupled Lake Problem

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The Single Lake Game

- Players: Communities that share the lake
- Pollution: Phosphorus applied to land (controls) Accumulation in the lake (state)
- ▶ Benefits: Increased crop production → profits
- ▶ Costs: Phosphorus → nutrients for weeds and algæ

Single Lake Problem Coupled Lake Problem

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Upstream/Downstream Game

Players: Upstream and downstream communities

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Upstream/Downstream Game

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Upstream/Downstream Game

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- Interconnection: Some upstream pollution flows downstream

Single Lake Problem Coupled Lake Problem

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Upstream/Downstream Game

- Players: Upstream and downstream communities
- Pollution: Upstream and downstream application of P
- Interconnection: Some upstream pollution flows downstream
- Benefits: Increased crop production
- Costs: Accumulation of phosphorus in the lakes

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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Assumptions

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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Assumptions

Separable functional form for costs and benefits

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Assumptions

- Separable functional form for costs and benefits
- Agreement on functional form of costs

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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Assumptions

- Separable functional form for costs and benefits
- Agreement on functional form of costs
- Player's benefits are a function of his/her own loading

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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State Equations

Upper lake

$$x_{t+1} = b_x x_t + \frac{x_t^2}{1 + x_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t}$$

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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$$x_{t+1} = b_x x_t + \frac{x_t^2}{1 + x_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t}$$



$$y_{t+1} = b_y y_t + \frac{y_t^2}{1 + y_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t} + \mu x_t$$

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Weighted Social Welfare Criteria

The Planner's Problem

$$\max_{\{a_{i,t}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left(W_{1}(a_{1,t},\cdots,a_{n,t},x_{t}) - \lambda W_{2}(a_{1,t},\cdots,a_{m,t},y_{t}) \right)$$

$$x_{t+1} = bx_t + \frac{x_t^2}{1 + x_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t}$$

$$y_{t+1} = by_t + \frac{y_t^2}{1+y_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t} + \mu x_t$$

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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Objectives and the Game Potential

Each upper lake player solves

$$\max_{\{a_{i,t}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left(u_{i}(a_{i,t}) - k_{i}c(x_{t}) \right)$$

$$x_{t+1} = bx_t + \frac{x_t^2}{1 + x_t^2} + \sum_i a_{i,t}$$

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

Objectives and the Game Potential

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Potential function

$$\max_{\{a_{1,t}\ldots a_{n,t}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\sum_i u_i(a_{i,t})/k_i - c(x_t) \right)$$

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Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

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Objectives and the Game Potential

Each lower lake player solves

$$\max_{\{a_{j,t}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(u_j(a_{j,t}) - k_j c(y_t) \right)$$

$$y_{t+1} = by_t + \frac{y_t^2}{1+y_t^2} + \sum_j a_{j,t} + \mu x_t$$

Characterization Cooperative Game Noncooperative Game

Objectives and the Game Potential

Each lower lake player solves

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Properties of Solutions

Two possible optimal steady states:

Low P oligotrophic low in nutrients High P eutrophic high in nutrients

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Upper lake converges monotonically to SS

Properties of Solutions

Two possible optimal steady states:

Low P oligotrophic low in nutrients High P eutrophic high in nutrients


- Upper lake converges monotonically to SS
- Skiba points (both steady states are optimal)

Properties of Solutions

Two possible optimal steady states:


Low P oligotrophic low in nutrients High P eutrophic high in nutrients


- Upper lake converges monotonically to SS
- Skiba points (both steady states are optimal)
- Lower lake very sensitive to μ



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
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
Upper Lake Lower Lake



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
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
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Upper Lake Lower Lake




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Upper Lake Lower Lake



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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